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THE LAW AND MR. SmITH. By Max Radin. The Bobbs-Merrill Com-
pany, Indianapolis, 1938. Pp. 333. Price: $3.oo.
Here in jurisprudence made popular a distinguished law teacher comes
to the defense of judges and lawyers. Mr. Smith, addressee of the book, is
any layman. When in deciding a case about airplane flights the United
States Supreme Court relies on a statute passed in 1790 and an English
case of vintage 1773, Mr. Smith (so a blurb informs us) throws down his
evening paper and erupts anger and disgust. For such emotions Professor
Radin seeks to substitute "confidence" and sympathetic understanding. His
purpose is to explain to Mr. Smith what law is, how it got that way, and
how it functions in certain traditional fields. He divides his discourse,
accordingly, into three main parts.
Part One on The Nature of Law (6 chapters, 46 pages) begins, in
a manner not unknown to social scientists, with Alexander Selkirk ma-
rooned alone on his happy island. Here there is no law. But introduce
even one other person, a fortiori millions, and rules become necessary to
keep down conflicts and provide that certainty without which life is intol-
erable. Rules are habits made conscious. Of the multitudinous rules in
any society those are legal which a court will enforce. Law now is a
prophecy of future court action. Courts are made up of judges, uninspired
human beings "extremely like the rest of us." Judges do not do as they
please; they bow to precedents, statutes, principles and justice. Precedent,
logical fitness, gets more deference than justice both because justice is often
indifferent and because while "we can always recognize consistency," "we
cannot generally recognize justice." '1 Still justice-high and low-gets
some hearing. Rules from precedents do not form a complete system and,
furthermore, judges are clever in the art of distinguishing. Low justice is
custom, common agreement. High justice, it later appears, is what we
take on faith.
Less arid is Part Two (io chapters, 18o pages) on the Development
of Legal Institutions and Ideas. Primitive societies, North American
Indians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Israelites, Greeks and Romans are all on
parade as the author demonstrates how "law" has developed from an
"undifferentiated mass" of "morals, manners, religion, propriety and com-
munal self-protection." Chapter headings are reliable indices of content
and style: Judges and Governors, The Mystery of Procedure, The
Interstices of Procedure and the Growth of Codes, The Sage and His
Authority, The Concentration of Legal Authority, The Law Attempts
to Get Above Itself, Good Law and Better Law, The Insoluble Prob-
lem (of getting "the facts"). Two additional chapters contain more
explicit contributions to the author's general apologia. In Legal Authority
Becomes a Command he points out that judges in applying a statute must,
because of the inherent ambiguity of words, "interpret" whether they will
or not and that in interpreting it is perfectly "right and proper", even inev-
itable, for them to consider the practical consequences, the results desirable
or undesirable, of competing interpretations. In Authority Is Content to
Be Persuasive he expands his defense of precedent. Its basis is in human
i. Professor Radin elsewhere suggests that it is not always easy to recognize con-
sistency.
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nature. Economy of effort apart, "a definite trait of the human mind impels
us to prefer to our unguided, self-derived judgment the direction or protec-
tion of a mind we regard as better." 2 Furthermore, "consistency is a real
and powerful constituent of justice"; reasonable expectations of the public
are not lightly to be denied. Happily precedent's "binding quality", "a late
and special development" and most offensive to laymen, is fast disappearing.
Part Three (7 chapters, 87 pages) on The Substance of Law offers
brief essays, oriented largely toward the past, on torts, contracts, property
and crimes. Property created by the Supreme Court under the aegis of
"due process" gets a single brief paragraph. Though raising "the most
crucial legal issue of the future", such property is expressly exempted from
the author's survey. In two final chapters the author vigorously reaffirms
his conviction that lawyers should not be abolished. They are indispensable
so long as we cannot get back to that happy island with which our story
began. The thing for the layman to do to promote "the growth of the law
and the discovery of justice" is to discard his "unreasonable attitude of
irritation and suspicion." What we need is more "confidence" from laymen
and more "persistent thinking" by lawyers. Law is not "a mysterious
instrument by which miracles can be effected." A court "is not properly
supposed to have as its purpose the task of reforming our social life." That
is not a legal function.
Such is Professor Radin's thesis. In obvious contrast with his philos-
ophy of acceptance are the iconoclastic protests of Frank and Arnold. A
reader's preference is likely to depend upon his social values. Professor
Radin is an accredited member of the "realistic school" of legal writers.8
Right-wing members of this group will be pleased with his performance.
Left-wing members will tend to think his benedictions indiscriminate. He
could have defended our democratic governmental framework, with its
peaceful settlement of disputes by arbitration and compromise, without de-
fending its incubus of ideology and folklore.4 He could have assigned a
much greater creative, reforming, function to judges. His definition of
"law" as prophecy, as doctrine, is insight from a very limited perspective
only. From a broader perspective any differentiation of "law" from morals,
manners, economics and so forth is illusory. Indeed the greatest present
concern of the layman is with that growing edge of social change where
"law" and "economics" are hopelessly intermingled. Some probing into the
"conflicts" which here produce "law" and into the kind of "law" so pro-
duced might have arrested Mr. Smith's attention. Sed qucere. When the
definitive theory of social change comes to be formulated, it scarcely seems
probable that a high place will be given to books either praising or damning
lawyers. Such books, with rare exceptions, are born to waste their fra-
grance on the desert air.
Myres S. McDougal jf
CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION. By Irston R. Barnes. F. S.
Crofts & Co., New York, 1938. Pp. xx, 984. Price: $7.00.
Would a medical student make a case study of wounds by studying
court decisions dealing with the liability of doctors for the proper treatment
'I Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. The phrasing is from an earlier chapter.
3. Cf. Professor Llewellyn's famous roll call (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 at 1259.
4. He does state that much of our lawyers' "jargon" is today "unnecessary".
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